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Glossary 
 
I have used the pinyin rendering of the Chinese throughout this dissertation 
except where I directly quote or refer to names and words arising from sources I 
have cited which use the Wade-Giles system. 
 
Pinyin 
 
Wade-
Giles 
Chinese 
character 
Meaning 
chunbai ch’un-pai 純白 purity, pure whiteness 
de te 德 power, virtue 
ji chi 機 trigger of a crossbow; what sets 
things in motion; opportunity; 
machine. 
ji xie chi-hsieh 機械 mechanical tools  
ji xin chi-hsin 機心 machine heart 
qi ch’i 氣 ‘energy’ 
qing ch’ing 情 true being of things 
ren jen 人 man 
shen shen 神 spirit 
sheng sheng 生 to be born 
tian t’ien 天 heaven 
wu wei wu-wei 無為 actionless action 
xie hsieh 械 ‘mechanical’, ‘apparatus’ 
xin hsin 心 heart 
xue hsüeh 血 blood 
xing hsing 性 innate nature 
yang yang 陽 yang 
yin yin 陰 yin 
zangfu tsang-fu 臟腑 vital organs 
ziran tzu-jan 自然 spontaneous action 
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The Notion of the Machine Heart (ji xin 機心)  
in the Zhuangzi: 
The Ethical Relationship Between Technology and Nature 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Well-Sweep 
 
(Ivanhoe and Van Norden 2001) 
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Introduction 
 
Tzu-kung [Zigong] … travelled south to the land of Ch’u. On his way 
back, he passed through Chin and along the south bank of the Han 
river. There he saw an old man going to plant his field. He had dug a 
[diagonal] tunnel to reach the water down in a well. He entered the 
tunnel clutching a large jug and then came out again to bring water 
for irrigating his field. It was a hard job which required much effort 
for a meagre result. Tzu-kung said to the gardener: “There’s a tool for 
this kind of work; in a day you could irrigate a hundred fields. It 
demands but little effort for a big result. Wouldn’t you like to have 
one?’ 
 
The Gardener looked up and squinted at the speaker, saying: “What 
is it?” 
 
“All you need is some wood with holes drilled in it and then 
assembled like a machine [a lever] that is heavy on one side, light on 
the other. By moving it up and down, you can draw up water in a 
constantly flowing stream. It is called a well-sweep. At these words 
the gardener turned red with anger and said with a laugh: “I have 
heard my master say that where there are machines, there will be 
the problems of machines, and these problems will produce people 
with hearts like machines. With a heart like a machine in your breast, 
there will be a lacking in pure whiteness. The gods of life [of the 
body] will be disturbed and there will no longer be a place there for 
the Tao to dwell. It is not that I do not know your machine. I would be 
ashamed to use it!”  
 
When Tzu-kung told this story to Confucius, Confucius said: “That 
fellow must be one of those who follow the Arts of Sire Chaos!” 
 
Zhuangzi (tr. Schipper, 1994:196)  
 
The story above will form the basis of a broad-ranging discussion in which I will 
explore the ethical relationship between technology and nature. During the 
course of this discussion, I will refer at various points to the dialogue that takes 
place between Zigong and the Gardener. The well-sweep which is the object of 
their conversation opens up a number of interesting issues about the character 
of technology. For instance, the difference between machines and tools and the 
etymological origins of the Chinese word for machinery which is reflected in 
technologically-averse Daoism. 
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The Gardener in the Zhuangzi forces us to consider the thought (heretical 
perhaps in his own time as well as today) that the use of technological devices is 
morally dangerous and can be deeply damaging to personal well-being. This 
passage from the Zhuangzi could be dismissed as the anarchic rantings of a 
Daoist primitivist - ‘Down with technology!’ as A.C. Graham puts it (2001:185). 
Graham goes on to argue that it is a metaphorical rather than a literal objection 
to technology, alluding more to one’s spiritual disposition than an actual 
criticism of our practical engagement with machines and devices. However valid 
the metaphorical reading of the Gardener’s story, I believe a literal translation 
and interpretation indicate that, even over two thousand years ago, the author 
of the Zhuangzi was aware of the tension that still exists for us today between 
technology and nature. I will argue that the Zhuangzi traces the source of this 
tension to a ‘certain mind-set’ or ‘disposition of the Heart’ (xin心) that governs 
our relationship with nature.  
 
Throughout this dissertation I have taken the deliberate step of using the 
capitalised form ‘Heart’ to alert the reader that the concept under discussion is 
not simply the physical organ of Western medicine but a term that carries much 
broader significance. Wherever I have used the capitalised form ‘Heart’ it 
signifies the Chinese word xin (心), which, as Chapter One makes clear, has 
important connotations which the English language concept fails to convey. 
 
This dissertation will explore the sense in which the Chinese notion of Heart is 
central to our understanding of what it means to be a human being. It will ask 
what the implications are for our humanity if the Heart itself becomes a 
machine, such that its primary ‘design’ is to enslave nature for human ends 
through ever more sophisticated technology. Scholars such as Szerszynski have 
already considered one part of this equation in the debate around Entzauberung 
or the disenchantment of nature, according to which theory nature itself has 
been stripped of its mystique by the rational forces of science manifesting 
themselves as various technologies that extract nature’s resources (2005:4). This 
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dissertation will argue that the idea of a Machine Heart (ji xin機心), which sees 
nature simply in terms of its potential for exploitation by technological means, 
has an important role to play as the complementary correlate of a disenchanted 
nature.  
 
In the Zhuangzi the nature of reality is not so hard and fast. People’s elbows can 
grow into cockerels and birds can turn into fish. The Zhuangzi, urges us to stop 
for one moment and consider the world from a perspective that is not rigidly 
determined by human desires and classifications. However, a Machine Heart 
views the world more prosaically. It seeks reassurance about the predictability 
of the world. It looks for salvation from the finitude of the human condition in 
the solutions offered by technology, promising the easing of human burdens, 
the elimination of disease, and the prospect of leisure-filled longevity. 
 
I argue that if we concur with scientific realism that nature can only be 
understood through scientific laws and considered simply as a useful resource 
for human beings, this limits human freedom to following an exclusively 
technological path. From such a perspective, even the Heart becomes reduced 
to a lump of bio-mechanical flesh that is subject to the same laws of physics as 
the disenchanted nature that it feeds on. If that is the conclusion, then we must 
agree with the author of the Zhuangzi, who, against the grain of both his own 
time and of our own, controversially appears to defend the useless and to pity 
those creatures and entities that give up their lives for human purposes. 
 
I suggest that the Zhuangzi points to a different choice. This choice involves 
acknowledging that ultimately there are many perspectives. The world as seen 
by science is only one such point of view. If we step outside the scientific 
paradigm we can begin to see that animate and inanimate beings that constitute 
nature all possess intrinsic value. The Zhuangzi tells us that if we become 
attuned to our own innate nature (xing性), we are able to connect with the 
innate nature of all other beings. Such co-being with nature constitutes genuine 
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freedom for human beings and for the creatures and entities whose world we 
share. 
 
Summary  
In Chapter One, my discussion starts with an appraisal of what the ancient 
Chinese understood by the human Heart (xin 心). It points to the unhelpful 
avenues that can occur so easily with interpretations that involve ideas 
concerning mind, emotions, physical organs and the like as they lead us to the 
limiting dimensions of dualism that depicts human beings in terms of mind and 
flesh. The concept of Heart epitomizes everything that is the core of humanity, 
and for each individual encompasses the personality, psychological, 
physiological and behavioural traits as well as ideas that we more readily 
associate with it within the emotive sphere. The Heart is the energy-centre that 
influences the whole person; the life-giving force that can so easily become 
diverted by thought patterns arising from a thirst for knowledge and 
classification of the world. The Zhuangzi urges the Heart to be stilled in order to 
find the true knowledge that arises from innate nature (xing 性). A central 
premise of this dissertation is that the Heart should be considered as the 
personal locus that defines our relationship to nature, whether that relationship 
is symbiotic and co-operative or anthropocentric and exploitative. 
 
Chapter Two surveys the Gardener’s dialogue with Zigong from a variety of 
contemporary ethical perspectives. It aims to discover whether, from today’s 
point of view where technology has become the hallmark of modern culture, we 
can find an analysis of the relationship between technology and nature that 
helps us to understand the Gardener’s radical position that those engaged with 
machinery are bound to develop a ‘Machine Heart’. 
 
Chapter Three explores ‘machine’ part of the Machine Heart (ji xin 機心). It 
discusses the etymology of ji (機) in order to fully understand what such a Heart 
might entail. The discussion focuses on the idea, proposed by Barry Allen that 
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only certain kinds of machine belong to dao technology. I ask whether there can 
be a dao technology, given the strictures in the Zhuangzi. 
 
In Chapter Four I turn to Heidegger’s analysis of technology as framed in his 
essay The Question concerning Technology to elucidate the technological 
mindset that corresponds to the Zhuangzi’s Machine Heart. Heidegger’s premise 
that we have used technology to work on recalcitrant matter in order to make 
its hidden essence constantly available for a complex mesh of interrelated 
human needs may be expressed more coherently and extensively than the ideas 
contained the Zhuangzi’s parable of the Gardener; however, the underlying 
concerns are the same. Technology disempowers nature; rivers are not allowed 
to flow according to their natural rhythms; trees are not allowed to reach 
maturity; and animals must flee from human beings in order to preserve their 
lives. In a world so harnessed and forced into the various uniform moulds of 
technology, human beings can no longer share the rhythms of the cosmos, and 
imperil their innate inner nature that thrives on a non-acquisitive co-being with 
the natural world.  
 
Chapter Five, the final part of this dissertation, examines how the Zhuangzi 
depicts the emergence of the Machine Heart from the development of language. 
I argue that the Zhuangzi’s polemic against Confucian nominalism is connected 
to two important strands in the text. Firstly, it relates to the idea that the Heart 
needs to be stilled, to be starved of external stimuli that result in the constant 
verbal analysis of the world. Secondly, the Zhuangzi associates naming and 
classifying all entities in the world as a form of harnessing the inner essence or 
power of the thing. The Zhuangzi, as indeed the Daodejing, both warn against 
excessive cutting up of reality through language. 
 
I conclude the dissertation by commenting on Zhuangzi’s warning that all 
perspectives and values are relative. Bearing in mind the imperative that 
technology places on us to value the useful, the Zhuangzi controversially 
suggests that we may have much to learn by studying the useless. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
 
The Heart (xin 心) of the Matter 
 
Master Keng Sang [Gengsang] said, ‘Keep your body in unity, hold on 
to life, don’t become too anxious. Do this for three years and you can 
achieve the state of which I have spoken.’ 
 
Nan Jung Chu [Nanrong Chu] said, ‘The eyes are part of the body, I 
have never considered them to be anything other, but a blind person 
can’t see through his eyes. Ears are a part of the body, I have never 
considered them to be anything other, but a deaf person can’t hear 
through his ears. The heart is a part of the body, I have never 
considered it to be anything other, but the madman can’t experience 
feelings with his. The body is also part of the body, but my soul 
seems separated from it, because I try to find myself, but why can’t I 
find it? Now you say to me, “Keep your body in unity, hold on to life, 
do not become too anxious.” Despite all my attempts to understand 
your Tao, this goes in one ear and out the other.’  
Zhuangzi (tr. Palmer, 2006:201) 
 
Zhuangzi’s Gardener is most concerned about the effect on his spiritual and 
bodily equilibrium if his xin (心), or Heart, becomes like a machine. However, 
this simple paraphrasing of the text points to a fundamental issue behind the 
discussion that follows. What becomes immediately apparent is that this 
preliminary discussion of the Heart uses vocabulary that suggests a mind/body 
dualism that is alien to the Daoist understanding of the person. In the extract 
above, Nanrong Chu expresses the confusion that can arise when we start to talk 
about the body as if it were a thing apart from the self; when we cease to 
remember that it is our life. It is frequently observed that the Chinese did not 
share our Western understanding of the person as being composed of two 
separate substances (namely, corporeal matter animated by spiritual matter) 
but believed that both were different modalities of one substance, namely qi. 
The Heart is of particular importance as the organ of qi transformation, and as a 
site of the concentrated energy that defines the whole person. As Master 
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Gengsang tells us, we cannot keep the One, that is, remain the unified entity 
that we are, if we split away the body. Therefore, I argue in this chapter that, for 
the ancient Chinese, Heart should not be mistaken for a metaphorical concept 
only tangentially related to corporeal life of the person. 
 
This dualistic reading of xin has been compounded by a lack of consistency of 
translation. Commonly, the term is rendered as ‘heart/mind’, or even just 
‘mind’. This chapter discusses the limitations and contradictions that occur in 
mapping xin on to Western terminology, and attempts to draw out a number of 
characteristics that the ancient Chinese perceived xin to possess that 
differentiate it substantially from Western equivalents. 
 
The head and the Heart 
Our question, then, must start with the translation of xin into English. This is by 
no means straightforward as the cultural coordinates behind this elusive Chinese 
concept are somewhat different from those of the West. Wu Xiaoming brings 
this point home when he states: ‘...there was no differentiation in the Chinese 
tradition between an intelligent, theoretical, or rational mind and a sensible, 
emotional, or irrational heart, as has been the case in Western philosophy’ 
(2008:537). The Western paradigm depicts emotions as devoid of cogent 
thought and historically has associated them with the sensuality of the body. 
Logical thinking, on the other hand, has been considered as the domain of the 
mind or soul. Descartes truly encapsulated this when he wrote, ‘Thus, because 
we have no conception of the body as thinking in any way at all, we have reason 
to believe that every kind of thought present in us belongs to the soul’ 
(1985:329). Greatly impressed by Harvey’s groundbreaking work of the time that 
identified the heart’s bio-mechanical role in pumping blood around the body, 
Descartes suggested that the physical location for the soul might be in the brain, 
or more precisely as he identified it, the pineal gland, while the ‘passions’ of the 
body were conducted to the soul or mind via the ‘animal spirits’, minute 
particles that form the blood. Subsequent medical knowledge in the West has 
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developed on the basis of empirical evidence that the brain is the organ 
responsible for a variety of cognitive functions, including biochemical responses 
which constitute our emotions, while the heart has a purely mechanical action 
as the pump that maintains blood circulation throughout the body. However, 
despite Descartes, Western traditional medicine based on Galen’s humoral 
understanding of the person, has continued to inform our cultural heritage  
which still acknowledges the heart as being the notional seat of the emotions, 
the source of love and the locus of suffering when the heart is broken.  
 
When it comes to the translation of xin, it is often assumed that what the 
ancient Chinese must have meant to express can be rendered directly by ‘mind’, 
encompassing both rational thinking and emotional impulses that we 
understand as belonging to brain function. For instance, Zhang’s discussion of 
the ‘mind-body relationship in traditional Chinese philosophy’ awkwardly skips 
from talking about ‘the heart and its supposed functions such as those of a 
physical heart and brain’ (2007:384) to the convenient translation of xin as 
‘mind’. Kjellberg too, opts for the translation: ‘With a mechanical mind you 
cannot preserve your simplicity...’ (in Ivanhoe ed., 2005:236) resulting in a 
distortion of meaning and losing the emotive associations that the word heart 
automatically conjures up.  
 
‘Heart/mind’ is an alternative that is adopted to overcome this problem, for 
instance by Schwartz when he asserts: ‘Thus as early as the Book of Poetry the 
heart/mind already seems the centre of all those expressions of the conscious 
life we attribute to both heart and mind in the West’ (1985:185). While this 
solves one problem it presents another. The double-aspect heart/mind notion 
overlooks the inherent contradiction posed by the physical location of the heart. 
Angus Graham’s comment that ‘Chuang-tzu is also sceptical about the organ 
with which we think, which, it may be worth repeating, is not the brain but the 
heart’ (2001:11) (my italics) draws attention to this contradiction. The 
scientifically and medically informed language of today would find it 
incongruous to talk of a thinking heart, let alone concede that thinking could in 
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any way be traced to the heart’s biology. Are we really to take it that in the 
world of the Zhuangzi the physical heart is the place where thinking takes place? 
For, as Keekok Lee ironically comments, otherwise we must surely assume that 
the Chinese ‘...blotted their copybook because, perversely, in addition, they 
believed that the heart was the seat of thought. This belief discredits them in 
eyes of modern science.’ (2008:123). Interestingly, the ancient Chinese had little 
to say about the brain itself, other than believing it to be made of the same stuff 
as marrow, and classifying it as an ‘irregular’ organ, not to be counted among 
the five vital organs (Finger, 1994). It was not until the middle of the 16th 
Century, following the publication in Chinese of the treatise on memory by the 
Jesuit Matteo Ricci, that the brain with all the functions that we associate with it 
in the West, began to find a place in Chinese physiology (Gross, 1999:7). This still 
leaves us with the perplexing question of how we are to interpret the Heart in 
ancient Chinese thinking and whether its physical location has any bearing on 
the discussion at hand. 
 
The Heart in ancient Chinese medicine 
If we turn to traditional Chinese medicine, The Yellow Emperor’s Classic of 
Internal Medicine (Huangdi Neijing) tells us that the Heart is considered to be 
the ruling organ where the spirit (shen 神) resides and which contains blood 
(xue 血) (Finger, 1994:12). This most important of ancient texts for the Chinese 
medical tradition outlines the doctrine of zangfu whereby the five vital organs, 
heart, lungs, liver, spleen and kidneys are held responsible for balance and well-
being. Zangfu is based on a system of correspondence between these organs 
and the five phases that constitute all living things. According to the doctrine, 
the element that is associated with the Heart is fire, a symbol that reinforces the 
idea of the Heart as a powerful energy centre that is the source of life. Some 
schools of traditional Chinese medicine argue that the five organs correspond 
only notionally to the physical organs identified by Western medicine and should 
be understood metaphorically as an energetic system based on philosophical 
principles. This allows authorities on the subject, such as Liu Zhanwen, to 
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skilfully override the problem of the physical location of ‘mind,’ as the following 
paragraph suggests: 
 
In the theory of visceral manifestation the physiological function and 
pathological changes of the brain are ascribed to the heart, since the 
heart is the chief of the zang organs. The emotions are further 
assigned severally to the five zang organs, thus, the heart houses the 
mind and controls joy; the lung houses the soul and controls grief; 
the spleen houses intention and controls brooding; the liver houses 
the ethereal soul and controls rage; and the kidney houses will and 
controls fear.  
 
(Liu Zhanwen, 2009) 
 
This would suggest that the Heart has a theoretical - and to Western thinking, 
empirically unproven - role in terms of health maintenance and should be 
understood more as metaphorical concept rather than the actual physiological 
organ of thought and emotion. Hence the argument that Heart should equate to 
mind and in medical reality should be located in the brain, dismissing any talk 
about it as the actual physical organ itself. 
 
A possible further argument for supporting the case that the Heart would be 
only a metaphor for the ancient Chinese is the claim that Chinese knowledge of 
anatomy was limited as their medical approach developed from a completely 
different kind of observational base, one that noted external influences on 
health and well-being, such as the effect of weather and seasons, in contrast 
with the Western medical tradition from the time of the Enlightenment which 
examined the effects of disease on the body, focusing ever more closely on 
examining the physical structure of internal organs. Actual dissections in ancient 
China were rare as the veneration of ancestors forbade the cutting open the 
human body (Finger, 1994:12). No dissections were documented until 16 CE 
when the emperor Wang Mang (c. 45 BCE - 23 CE) ordered a rebel to be 
dissected in order to measure the internal organs and identify the location of 
blood vessels (Schnorrenberger, 2008:37).  
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The character of the Heart 
If, however, we trace the development of the Chinese character of xin (心) from 
its ancient pictogram to the modern day rendering, it is clear that the ancient 
Chinese thought of the Heart not only metaphorically (as we interpret it) as a 
medical concept based on an energetic understanding of human body, but also 
as an actual physical organ, as can be seen in the figure below: 
 
 
(Lee, 2008:122) 
 
The stylised modern version of the character clearly retains the pertinent 
features of the figurative pictogram. The second pictogram from the left, 
appearing on oracle bones (jiaguwen甲骨文), suggests a degree of anatomical 
familiarity with the Heart’s four cavities that most likely arose from divination 
practices and regular encounters with war wounds during China’s turbulent 
ancient history (Lee, 2008:122). Returning to the Huangdi Neijing, the text 
demonstrates that the physiological relationship between the Heart and the rest 
of the body was well understood, when it states for instance, that a healthy 
Heart may be diagnosed from a strong pulse and a rosy complexion (Veith, 
2002:173). The purely physiological picture, however, was considered as 
identical with the dynamic action of the Heart: ‘When the liver receives the life-
giving force from the heart, it is from there transmitted to the spleen, whence it 
is passed on to the kidneys; here it reaches its utmost, so that it meets death 
when it arrives at the lungs’ (2002:179). This reinforces the argument for the 
central importance of the Heart as directly responsible for the proper physical 
functioning of all other organs as well as an energetic centre that generates all 
vital signs of life in the individual. Certainly the passage in question in the 
Zhuangzi takes it that the Heart, with all its thinking and feeling functions, is 
located just where we would expect it be: in the chest. 
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The Heart as ‘field of force’ 
Thinking and feeling are important but not the only characteristics of the Heart. 
A person’s physical appearance and demeanour were thought to be determined 
by xin as suggested by Mark Elvin when he asserts that: 
The corporeal attributes may be the expression of the heart-mind or 
xin, a concept that can be interpreted as the psychological field of 
force that is attempting to control the body, and which reveals itself 
in physical structure and posture, or they may be more superficial 
properties like beauty in the sense of “prettiness.” The sartorial 
attributes are clothes, and items like clothes, such as auras. They 
basically express social and, to some extent, moral status.  
(1989:267) 
 
Elvin’s compact analysis at first sight suggests another variation on the familiar 
dualism already under discussion, one in which our Western training attributes 
psychological impulses to the brain, and apparently continues the supposed mix 
up between Heart and brain by the ancient Chinese. However, a dualistic 
reading would miss out on the important statement he makes when he calls xin 
a ‘field of force’. On my interpretation, this should not be considered as 
something separate from the body that is morphing it into a specific shape, but 
as an energy centre arising in the physical Heart whose influence extends well 
beyond the limit of the Heart’s boundaries. The idea of a magnet placed under a 
sheet of paper that is able to determine the shape of iron filings scattered on the 
surface of the paper would be an appropriate comparison. This presents xin in a 
new light, as a powerful impetus that is able to determine one’s physical 
attributes and the way one presents oneself to others. In this way the Heart may 
be seen as being extremely sensitive to social, environmental or moral 
influences, whose effects are expressed in malleable physical traits such as 
posture and physiognomy, conveying both passing and more fixed emotional 
states. The Heart, then, is the organ of physical transformation, defining each 
particular individual. Its sphere of influence, the ‘psychological field of force’ 
reverberates through the individual and meshes intimately with the world it 
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touches, literally through the touch of flesh on the world and through the 
exploration of meaning and emotion conveyed by the touch.  
 
However, biological factors such as bodily impairments from birth or from 
disease, may result in certain physical characteristics that should not be 
assumed to arise from the psychological, or indeed, moral condition of the 
Heart. This was a source of controversy in traditional Chinese thinking, as in 
other ancient cultures such as our own Judeo-Christian heritage, since a causal 
connection was often made between illness, physical defects and the 
impairment of the individual’s spiritual state. For example, the Zhuangzi shows 
Confucius’s prejudice against Choptoes who suffered punishment by mutilation 
for his misdemeanours (Graham, 2001:78). Confucius, in this and other 
examples, assumes that spiritual power, which comes from the dao, and hence 
the moral quality of the individual, is adversely affected if body shape is 
damaged, either from birth, by accident, or deliberately by mutilation, as the 
dao cannot flow naturally and perfectly through an imperfect vessel. However, 
the Zhuangzi takes issue with such a reductive method of judging the character 
and moral worth of a person. For instance, Ugly-face attracts women who want 
to be his concubines, Cripple-Lipless commands the respect of the Duke Ling of 
Wei and Pitcher-neck with the goiter is likewise highly respected by Duke Huan 
of Qi (Graham, 2001:80). They are so appreciated that others who lack their 
physical characteristics are considered to be the ones who are deformed. 
Although these examples cannot claim to illustrate that the Zhuangzi was, 
anachronistically, against a modern day style of dualism, they do suggest that he 
viewed morality in terms of relative human judgements, rather than as spiritual 
force that could directly result in physical imperfection.  
 
The Heart of profound pain 
Other ancient Chinese sources can also help to flesh out how the Heart was 
understood. For Mengzi the Heart’s ability to empathise with others argued for 
it being the essence of humanity. Mengzi tells us that among the four features 
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that characterise the Heart (the ‘heart of compassion’, the ‘heart of shame’, the 
‘heart of respect’ and the ‘heart of right or wrong’) it is the heart of compassion, 
or as Wu claims for its literal translation, ‘the heart of profound pain’ which is 
the most dominant (2008: 573). It is an extraordinary feature of the Heart that 
among the many outside influences that it assimilates, it is the pain of others 
which it can experience most vividly. We can perhaps relate most readily to this 
idea through the Western Christian notion of the wounded heart of Jesus, which 
is capable of viscerally experiencing the pain of others. This ability may reinforce 
Elvin’s holistic ‘field of force’ idea more strongly than anything else, as when we 
experience the pain of others, we too will be moved physically, not just in the 
expressions wrought on the face, the posture and the gesture by our emotions, 
but notably, in our actions. This Heart of profound pain leads us to behave 
spontaneously in the interests of another. Wu cites the examples of the king 
who is cannot bear the suffering of the sacrificial ox and the person who sees a 
child about to fall into a well. This impulse is the most human characteristic of 
all. As Wu puts it, ‘the heart of compassion signifies the humanity of the human’ 
(2008: 574). The Heart that responds to the interests of another is also the Heart 
that reaches out beyond the world of humans to the natural world of animate 
and inanimate beings, recognising the imperilment of the interests of another. It 
is the Heart that intuitively ‘knows’ the state of another’s Heart, sensing the 
Heart of the natural world, as it is itself part of nature. 
 
The thinking Heart 
With the Heart as the life-centre for the whole person, there is no inherent 
contradiction involved in talking about the Heart’s capacity for thinking for we 
are no longer in the realm of reductive medical science. Therefore when the 
Zhuangzi discusses some of the pejorative effects of thinking on the body it 
should not be thought that he is making a claim for the body as a separate 
substance. There are many such examples that echo the words of the Zhuangzi’s 
Gardener when he says, ‘With a heart like a machine in your breast, there will be 
a lacking in pure whiteness. The gods of life [of the body] will be disturbed and 
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there will no longer be a place there for the Tao to dwell’. In a similar vein, for 
instance, Nanrong Chu dolefully says, ‘If I am full of knowledge, I injure my body’ 
(Schipper, 1993:199) and of the man who does not let emotions have an effect 
on him Zhuangzi (the character) says: ‘The Way gives him a face and Heaven 
provides a shape. He does not allow either the good or the bad to have any 
effect on him. But you now, you wear your soul upon your sleeve, exhausting 
energy, propping yourself up on a tree, mumbling, or bent over your desk, 
asleep. Heaven gives you form, and you wear it out with pointless argument!’ 
(Palmer, 2006:45). 
 
All of these examples point to the importance of the Heart/body dynamic in the 
Zhuangzi, as it is an organ of such sensitivity that all experiences and 
interactions with the world are consumed by its energetic centre and are 
transformed as thought energy that reverberates throughout the body. The idea 
that constant thinking (characterised in more modern times as thought patterns 
underlying anxiety and stress) has damaging effects on our health is common to 
many religious and philosophical approaches that advocate meditation practices 
where the aim is to eliminate thoughts and create a mental void, resulting in a 
state of complete physical relaxation. In Daoist belief, the body is commonly 
depicted as a landscape, complete with buildings and palaces where different 
gods resided. These gods were the interface between human beings (ren 人) 
and Heaven (tian 天), serving to maintain a microcosmic/macrocosmic balance. 
If someone was in a state of agitation, or constantly preoccupied with worldly 
affairs, this would be reflected in their energetic make-up with consequences for 
the physical body, whose ability to function naturally would become impaired. It 
is because the Heart has a variety of modes, including influencing the physical 
functions of the body by enabling the flow of energy (qi) through the other 
organs, that the quality of that energy will be affected by its consecutive mode 
which involves thinking, having a potentially detrimental effect on the entire 
person. 
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The practice that the Zhuangzi advocates in order to avoid damaging the body is 
the ‘fast of the Heart’, a practice that involves more than bodily privations: 
‘“Concentrate with your will. Do not listen with your ears, but with your heart. 
Do not listen with your heart, but with your ch’i ...the ch’i are ‘empty’ and thus 
responsive to all beings. The Tao is found in that ‘void’ and that ‘void’ is the ‘fast 
of the heart”’ (Graham, 2001, 1996: 68). In order to allow the Heart to fast, all 
outside stimuli must be shut off to prevent constant questioning and thought. 
This state of inner quietness induces the ability to become one with the dao, 
allowing a completely natural state of being to set in, the state of being that we 
are born with, according to the Zhuangzi when it states: ‘Can you be like as a 
child, a newborn who moves without knowing what it does, who moves without 
knowing where it goes? Its body is like dried out wood, its heart like dead ashes.’ 
(Schipper 1994: 199) When we achieve this state, according to the Zhuangzi, we 
return to our innate nature (xing性) which mirrors the innate nature of all 
entities. It is this state that allows the artisan such perfect engagement with his 
medium. For the sword maker it is the sword; for the butcher it is the ox, and for 
the swimmer it is the river. The distinction between human beings as subject 
and the rest of the world as object disappears as all are unified in a state of 
wordless knowing. In this state of inner attentiveness the heart loses its physical 
properties, as it is reduced to qi (氣), the base form of all cosmic matter which it 
shares with all entities (Zhang, 2007: 387). 
 
There are several examples that illustrate this process. In one little cameo from 
the Zhuangzi, Old Tan has just emerged from his ablutions, his wet hair 
streaming down his back, and is standing outside in the fresh air letting the wind 
dry his hair. He is so lost in a trance, that Confucius, who has come to visit him, 
says that his body is like ‘withered wood’. His Heart, that is roaming at the 
‘beginning of things’, is constrained so that he is totally unable to speak (Graham 
2001:130). In another example, Nanguo Ziqi is lying on his couch, breathing 
deeply and lost in meditation. His friend, Yancheng Ziyou looks at him in 
astonishment and says: ‘Can the frame really be made to look like withered 
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wood, the heart dead like dead ashes?’ (2001:48) These examples reinforce the 
importance of the Heart co-incidentally being physical organ as well as the 
energy centre of the person. The fasting the Heart slows the pulse, in the case of 
meditation, reducing bodily functions to a bare minimum, and in the case of the 
artisans, allowing the pure flow of unconscious movement. 
 
Chapter conclusion 
In the Zhuangzi the Heart was conceived as the physiological powerhouse that 
enabled either spiritual transcendence or moral decline through its direct 
interface with all aspects of Heaven and Earth. The Zhuangzi’s Gardener may be 
primarily concerned with the potential loss of his own spiritual equilibrium, but 
as the Primal Man of Chaos (Palmer, 2006) he is cosmologically entwined with 
the natural environment at a stage before it becomes differentiated into the 
myriad things. By shunning the world of technology, he attempts to maintain the 
purity and whiteness (chunbai 純白) that is the innate state of all human 
beings, where the Heart remains uncomplicated by knowledge that pertains to 
the world and becomes a truly knowing Heart that is at one with the dao and all 
nature. Such knowledge remains not only unspoken, but is incapable of 
articulation. 
 
From this discussion, the picture of the Heart that emerges, is that in a 
microcosmic sense, it encapsulates the entire person. Rather than being thought 
of as a specific organ, I suggest that it should be seen as the source of the life-
energy of a person that is the very core of their being. This core is a vital 
dynamic thing that encompasses many modes of being. Some of these relate to 
health, well-being and the proper functioning of the body; some to the 
character, attitude and demeanour of the person; while others relate more to 
the internal world of the Heart such as moral judgement, emotions and thinking. 
In all of its modes, the Heart’s effects on the body mesh as one vital organism.  
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From this exploration of the Heart we can begin to understand the far-reaching 
significance of the Gardener’s assertion that engagement with machines will 
produce problems and ‘these problems will produce people with hearts like 
machines’. In what sense can we understand what it means to have such a 
Heart? As the Heart reaches out to the world that surrounds us, what becomes 
of its essential qualities if that world is one that is based on calculated gain and a 
purely scientific perception of nature? The next chapter surveys current ethical 
positions with regard to technology in order to gauge whether we have 
sufficiently sensitive models to understand how the Heart can be so 
fundamentally altered as to become a machine. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
 
Watering the Garden: What is Wrong with Technology? 
 
 
It is not that I do not know your machine.  
I would be ashamed to use it! 
Zhuangzi (tr. Schipper, 1994:196) 
 
 
Zigong’s question embodies an innocent assumption which underlies a common 
approach to technology: surely it is a good thing to relieve the human body from 
performing repetitive and exhausting work and use our inventive abilities to 
create tools and machines to carry out such tasks? Certainly the dominant 
worldview today expresses a similar sentiment. The technologically adept West 
provides a model to which developing countries aspire, both for humanitarian 
reasons in order to eradicate disease and poverty, or for sheer economic gain as 
only those players able to wield technological solutions can compete in world 
markets. Bar apocalyptic disaster, there is no turning back the clock to a pre-
technological society. So why should we not wholeheartedly embrace the 
technological world we live in with full confidence that we now have the 
scientific knowledge and technological sophistication to manage any issues 
pertaining to both our local and global environment? 
 
This chapter will examine a number of ethical perspectives with regard to 
technology and will trace how the values that underpin technology impact 
directly on how we perceive nature and behave towards it. The passage from 
the Zhuangzi contains two opposing views. Zigong’s naive optimism endows 
technology with a soteriological goal and places great faith in human knowledge 
and inventiveness. In sharp contrast, the Gardener’s moral condemnation is 
harder to define insofar as it may fit any number of ethical positions with regard 
to technology that are very much part of our contemporary environmental 
debate.  
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The value-neutral view 
According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ‘Technology approaches 
and systematizes the solution of practical problems’ (Franssen, 2009:6) and 
suggests that the discipline most closely associated with it is engineering. The 
term technology is used generically to describe the practical and ingenious 
solutions we have invented on the back of the scientific knowledge which so 
permeates contemporary culture. We tend to use the word as indicating a set of 
diverse capabilities, along the lines defined by Jacques Ellul: ‘Technique is the 
totality of methods rationally arrived at and having absolute efficiency (for a 
given stage of development) in every field of human activity’ (1973).  
 
In Western Europe the rise of technology is associated with the development of 
machines that took piecework from the hands of individuals to mass scale 
production by machines during the Industrial Revolution. Hand-produced 
craftwork relies heavily on the knowledge and expertise of an individual 
craftsperson, and gives no guarantee of the consistency and uniformity of the 
end product. According to Szerszynski (2009:35), crafts in this respect have 
historically been considered inferior (rightly or wrongly) to technological 
production as the outcome is often uncertain and unpredictable. The chief 
characteristics of technological equipment or machines in general are the 
elements that can guarantee a blueprint for consistent production and 
replication. These elements consist of: accurate measuring tools and systems; 
well defined and commonly agreed processes; clearly set out functions and set 
purpose; efficiency; durability; constancy, and so forth. Technological solutions 
must ensure a standard product from which all human, fallible elements have 
been removed.  
 
Thus far, technology appears in a fairly neutral light with regard to ethics. It is 
based on objective scientific knowledge which gives us a clear understanding of 
how nature works. It has enabled us to develop the equipment we need for the 
25 
 
most efficient extraction of nature’s resources, for controlling nature’s powerful 
forces and for solving our small and large scale problems.  
 
The value-neutral view prevents any scrutiny of technology as a fundamental 
mode of human behaviour as the moral dimension applies only to questioning 
specific instances of how technology is used. The ‘value-neutral’ view asks that 
we only examine the uses to which technology is put and regulate them 
according to the moral frameworks that govern society at any given time. If we 
claim that technology per se is value-neutral it remains unassailable, as no moral 
dictum can be attached to it. This standpoint arises from a more fundamental 
idea that knowledge itself is value neutral, an issue which the Zhuangzi 
challenges. If we apply the value-neutral view to the example of the Gardener, 
we might duly conclude that his angry response to Zigong’s suggestion is 
unwarranted, as using a machine is hardly going to harm his spiritual well-being. 
 
The normative view 
Willem Drees (2009:12) emphasises the extent to which we are part of a culture 
which is built on supreme confidence in the powers of technology whose visible 
manifestation in the form of now largely electronic devices belies the hidden 
depths of the technological infrastructure that supports society. He points to the 
extent to which technology determines social organisation, education, medicine 
and the skills required for the world of work as well as home-life and 
entertainment. Technology is hardwired into the structure of society as well as 
our psychology, arising, he suggests, from a problem-solving attitude being at 
the core of human ways of thinking. 
 
In ethical terms technology is most commonly thought as having normative 
value. The dominant assumption in both the time of the Zhuangzi and our own is 
that technology is there for the betterment of humanity. Unlike science that tells 
us how things are, technology tells us how things ought to be in order to 
improve human (or animal or environmental) conditions (Franssen, 2009:7). 
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Under this view it is qualitatively opposed to ‘nature’ or the way things naturally 
occur. This, by contrast is depicted as chaotic, unpredictable and destructive. 
Although the use of technological solutions may have some unwanted 
consequences for the environment, under the normative view our technological 
culture is evidence of the progressive development of human society. Improved 
methods for medical diagnosis or instantaneous means of communication are all 
seen as examples of steps towards a better, if not utopian, society where ills and 
inconveniences will largely be eradicated.  
 
Bringing the discussion back to the Zhuangzi, we should put aside the prejudice 
that views the distant past as a foreign – not to mention primitive – country, and 
note the extent to which technology had already permeated Chinese society in 
the 4th century BCE. Although the earliest extant depiction of a well-sweep only 
occurs in the middle of the 2nd century CE in the tomb reliefs of Xiaotang Shan 
and Su Liang (Needham, 1978:225), we can assume from Zigong’s comments 
that even some 600 years earlier when the Zhuangzi was arguably written, it 
would not be considered an uncommon sight. This would make the Gardener’s 
method of watering the garden more the exception to be marvelled at than the 
rule. In the light of the apparent general familiarity with the well-sweep, we can 
understand how the Gardener’s comment that ‘A person who has machine tools 
is invariably involved in machine affairs’ would suggest that the use of such a 
machine has far-reaching implications beyond those of a labour saving device. A 
machine needs maintenance and regular attention. It becomes woven into the 
fabric of one’s life which becomes dependent on it. Certainly during later 
periods of Chinese history, the manipulation of waterways and irrigation 
techniques led to technological lock-in with agriculture and local economies 
being completely dependent on the resource of water (Elvin, 2004:123). The 
Gardener may well be expressing an important concern, based on contemporary 
observations, that the survival of communities at the time was entirely 
dependent on the effective functioning of such early examples of water 
engineering.  
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This view has implications for the Gardener in the Zhuangzi. His rejection of a 
technological solution could be seen in a very negative light. Perhaps he is an 
ignorant peasant, living in primitive conditions, with a superstitious fear of 
modern advances. Or, perhaps he is an intellectual idealist living out a fantasy 
world of being at one with nature, where in reality his body will be worn out by 
the physical exhaustion of labour. Or, more seriously, he is living on the fringes 
of society and potentially poses a threat to the established order by rejecting its 
norms and values, and is therefore morally suspect: a hippy or a Daoist 
anarchist! The normative view forces us to think of technology in positive terms, 
and side-lines those who think otherwise. It fails to question the ethical 
dimension of how technology relates to nature and leaves us unenlightened as 
to why the Gardener objects so strongly to the use of the well-sweep. 
 
The religious view 
The positive view of technology described above is represented by Zigong. Its 
ethos can be condensed into one simple formula: technology has the potential 
to save humankind from toil, premature sickness and death. It is not pushing the 
point too far to argue that Zigong sees technology in almost religious terms as 
the purveyor of utmost efficiency and, therefore, the saviour of humankind. This 
narrative is one that is recognised as a feature of the modern world by Bronislaw 
Szerszynski. He traces the historical development of techne from its raw craft 
form into its higher status in the Western Protestant world. In describing this 
trend he writes, ‘As ‘technology’, the practical arts were given a religious, 
soteriological function, as promising liberation from finitude and necessity by 
bringing the certainty of reason itself into humanity’s dealings with nature’ 
(2005: xiv).  
 
The soteriological view of technology described by Szerszynski is linked to the 
thesis that technology has taken on certain religious traits. Nature, by contrast, 
has lost the sacred character attributed to it by pre-modern societies. The 
28 
 
concept of Entzauberung which both Szerszynski (2009) and Miller (in Drees: 
2009) have adapted from Max Weber’s original idea (1919), claims that the 
disenchantment of nature has been caused notably by the dominance of 
scientific realism which deconstructs all natural phenomena into sets of 
scientific rules.  
 
The idea of a disenchanted nature carries moral overtones, which can be read in 
two completely different ways. On the one hand, it might be a favourable state 
of affairs. The rational power of science has held sway and swept away 
‘superstition’ and ignorance in a bright new age where technology provides 
solutions to combat nature’s weaknesses, and harnesses nature’s energies in 
hitherto undreamt of ways. On the other hand, the disenchantment of nature 
might represent science in a negative light. This view claims that striving to 
attain scientific knowledge is responsible for our loss of innocence; the fall from 
paradise into a world that holds no mystery as science disabuses the human race 
of any notion of the sacred. Both Szerszynski and Miller appear to avoid the 
ethical discussion by arguing that the subjugation of nature to technological 
control does not entail the hard and fast conclusion that nature has in fact 
become disenchanted, nor the sacred lost to a secular, technological society. 
Rather, in a somewhat Darwinian reading, they argue that, historically, the 
sacred is the primary state of affairs, and as such it has now surfaced at the 
heart of science and technology. While we embrace the knowledge of nature 
that science has given us, in certain aspects of our dealings with nature we 
retain the language of mystery as if the sacred has emerged for us in a new 
form. Until this is recognised, they argue, political and ethical debates about the 
role of religion in science and technology will remain fruitless. Technology, 
arguably a manifestation of a secular society, is imbued, according to 
Szerszynski, with characteristics that define the sacred. 
 
The Machine Heart, we can now begin to understand, is a perspective on the 
world that has already started to embrace scientific realism and creates a 
corresponding reality though the creation of nature-controlling technologies. 
29 
 
The first assumption of the Machine Heart is that it is the right of human beings 
to extract the power resources of nature, while nature itself is accorded no 
intrinsic rights. 
 
The monster in the machine: unrestrained technology 
Just as there are those who might side with Zigong’s astonishment at the 
Gardener’s disdain for technology, there are those who for a whole variety of 
different reasons would have a great deal of sympathy with the Gardener’s 
position. ‘The present environmental crisis is seen to be a result of a dominant 
modern worldview delineating assumptions about reality that are 
anthropocentric, materialist, economic and technology-based, separating 
humanity from and devaluing nature’ proclaims Watling (in Drees, 2009: 92). A 
prominent voice in the environmentalist camp cites worst case scenarios, such 
as the BP deep-water oil disaster in the Gulf of Mexico, as examples of 
overconfidence in technologies, leading inevitably to super-scale disasters. A 
milder variation of the critical view echoes concerns expressed by writers such 
as Ellul (1973) who bemoan the addictive effect of technology on society. There 
is the suggestion that such reliance on technology for every aspect of running 
our lives disempowers us insofar as we lose the most basic self-care skills. Ellul 
writes: ‘The reality is that man no longer has any means with which to subjugate 
technique, which is not an intellectual, or even, as some would have it, a 
spiritual phenomenon. It is above all, a sociological phenomenon; and in order 
to cure or change it, one would have to oppose to it checks and barriers of a 
sociological character’ (1973:306). 
 
These critical views of technology claim that it is out of control, no longer kept in 
hand by engineers and technicians who engender it. Frankenstein can no longer 
control his monster. These arguments contain a popular polemic against 
technology, anthropomorphised into a demonic force, or, to use Ellull’s 
language, a societal disease that requires ‘curing’. Looking under the surface of 
the polemic language, there is some serious attempt at analysis. The suggestion 
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is that technology is invested with an autonomous existence. It has become a 
life-force in its own right that is nourished by the promise of endowing its 
controllers with political power and the ultimate reward of financial gain. Under 
this view, the ethics of the situation are undermined by human greed and 
capitalist belief in market forces which have unleashed the monster of 
technology. 
 
Technological fakery 
A less provocative critique of technology claims that it removes us from an 
authentic experience of nature (Gruen in Jamieson, 2001:444). The 
authentic/spiritual environmental ethic is endorsed by Deutsch (in Callicott and 
Ames, 1989:259) who affirms that, ‘By “natural reverence” I mean the 
awareness of the belonging together of man and nature in freedom – in such a 
way that allows for a meaningful, creative play in that relationship.’ Thoreau, 
whose influence on the American naturalism that is so much part of modern day 
appropriation of Daoism, expresses this sentiment when he says: ‘Ancient 
mythology and poetry suggest, at least, that husbandry was once a sacred art; 
but it is pursued with irreverent haste and heedlessness by us, our object being 
to have large farms and large crops merely’ (2004). The response of the 
Gardener in the Zhuangzi can be readily interpreted in this light. His relationship 
with the earth and his hands-on cultivation of plants could amount to a life 
dedicated to an authentic experiencing of nature. The Gardener’s labour 
intensive work is wholesome, full of integrity, perhaps verging on the holy. Here, 
the authentic takes on a spiritual dimension, something that is readily suggested 
by the Daoist context of the Zhuangzi. The Gardener is in tune with the dao, and 
his actions reflect a supremely desirable state of affairs.  
 
Chapter conclusion 
These contemporary views of technology indicate the extent to which it has 
become the kind of creeping condition against which the Gardener in the 
Zhuangzi warns. Technology has become embedded in our culture to such an 
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extent that we can hardly see where its origins lie. For the Gardener it starts 
with the relatively innocent use of such simple technology as a pole, a lever and 
a bucket. A condition enters the human Heart which begins to change our 
outlook on the whole world. Even voices which today express caution about the 
use of technology do not address the central issue which is the attitude that 
comes to permeate the human Heart and transforms nature into a calculated 
resource for human beings. 
 
In summary, there is little in the environmental ethics debates of today that can 
readily explain to us why the Gardener in the Zhuangzi should choose, as a 
matter of principle, to make such heavy weather of watering his garden by hand. 
It is perhaps because our contemporary views of technology fail to identify the 
dynamic behind this cultural phenomenon that we are unable to gauge quite 
how it affects our relationship with nature. The next chapter will examine the 
‘machine’ element of the Machine Heart to see how it relates to the 
fundamental precepts of Daoism. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
 
Technology as Ji (機): the Trigger that sets  
Things into Motion 
 
 
‘Oh ho!’ said Hung Mung [Hong Meng]. ‘Strengthen your heart. 
Remain sure in actionless action, and all things will transform 
themselves. Reject your body, throw out hearing and eyesight, forget 
that you are anyone, become one with the Vast and the Void. Loosen 
the heart, free the spirit, be calm as if without a soul. All living things 
return to their root, not knowing why. Constantly in darkness, 
constantly in darkness, and throughout their physical existence they 
never depart from this. Ask not its name, seek not its shape. So all life 
comes to birth through itself.’ 
 
Zhuangzi (tr. Palmer, 2006:88)  
 
 
 
How to translate ji (機)? 
The Gardener warns that: ‘… where there are machines, there will be the 
problems of machines, and these problems will produce people with hearts like 
machines. With a heart like a machine in your breast, there will be a lacking in 
pure whiteness [chunbai 純白]’ (Schipper, 1993:196). The Gardener’s words in 
the Zhuangzi seem to elicit an uncomfortable response from modern 
translators. With a few notable exceptions, who are content to use ‘machine’ to 
translate the character ji (機), most employ somewhat evasive tactics and shy 
away from any translation that might suggest that it is technology per se that isl 
under attack. Mair, for instance, renders the Gardener’s closing remarks thus: 
‘Where there are ingenious contraptions there are sure to be ingenious affairs 
(you ji xin zhe bi you ji shi 有機械者必有機事)’ (Mair, 1994). Graham (2001), 
who is generally keen to bring out the philosophical nuances of the Zhuangzi, 
gives us the rather clumsy, ‘Whoever has contrivances with tricks to make them 
go is sure to have activities with tricks to make them go’ (2001:186). Needham 
translates ji as ‘cunning devices’ (1956:124). Although these English language 
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versions of the text are certainly carefully considered, and, on first, sight may 
seem quite innocuous, the additional use in each instance of the qualifying 
adjective sets a pejorative tone that seeks to avoid any suggestion that it is 
stereotyping technology in general. The idea conveyed by these translations is 
that the Gardener is objecting to a particular aspect of technology, or of human 
inventiveness that is characterised by being just too clever, too premeditated, 
and too intent on achieving results at any cost. The implication is that 
technology in general is not the target of the Gardener’s strictures. The 
sarcastic tone of the Gardener’s language is undeniable. But how can his 
objection to the simplest of technology – no more than a lever on a stick – be 
explained? The previous chapter explored contemporary, popular conceptions 
of technology in the hope of finding an interpretation of the Gardener’s 
standpoint that would make sense to us today. Such an analysis was found 
lacking. This chapter seeks to examine the proposition that for the Gardener 
only certain kinds of technology present a moral danger. It will explore the 
validity or otherwise of the implicit argument that there could be a form of 
technology that is specifically Daoist in the way it relates to nature. 
 
The article by Barry Allen, The Dao of Technology (2010), takes up the theme 
suggested by the translations above, and offers one of the few in-depth critiques 
available of the Gardener story. Allen’s thesis makes a number of related points. 
Firstly, he poses a question that echoes Needham’s analysis of the passage 
(1956:124) namely, in whose interest is it to irrigate such a large number of 
fields as proposed by Zigong? He hints that the Gardener’s Daoist politics would 
make him averse to supporting the feudal power of the lords who bear ultimate 
responsibility for introducing irrigation technology into the peasant agricultural 
economy. Why would the Gardener want to use a well-sweep, he asks. This 
argument is certainly in keeping with the Daoist attitude to authority. However, 
Allen’s real interest in the story is not to trace the socio-political history of 
technology in ancient China. The point which is key to Allen’s argument is that in 
Daoism only certain examples of technology are seen as wrong as they interfere 
with the way things naturally are.  
34 
 
 
Allen discusses the etymology of ji xie (機械) to support his interpretation that 
the Gardener does not have a wholesale objection to technology, only to certain 
manifestations of it. He claims the two words used in conjunction give a special 
emphasis to the Gardener’s meaning, suggesting something along the lines of 
‘mechanical machines’, or, as he goes on to qualify it, ‘machinish machines’. 
Their particularly clever action, Allen states, is to be contrasted with xie (械), 
tools in general which are viewed favourably throughout the Zhuangzi in its 
many examples of skilled artisans and the like who employ tools effortlessly. 
 
Ji xie has a literal translation as ‘machine tools’ (Unger, 2000: 44). Joachim Kurtz 
devotes a useful paragraph to explaining the origin of ji (2001). In ancient 
Chinese, the word denoted the trigger on a crossbow, with the associated 
meanings of its controlling function and its ability to set something into motion 
as well as that which ‘controls the beginning’. Although the word also has the 
sense of ‘skilful’ or clever’, it has a very specific sense, which he describes as 
follows: ‘... ji is used as a general allusion to moving mechanisms and parts, 
including skilfully manufactured devices, in particular transmission mechanisms 
assembled from many individual parts. All of these have a controlling, 
transmitting or driving function, and reflect the ingenious contraptions of their 
designers and are beneficial to their users’ (2001:180). Xie is the general word 
for utensils, implements and mechanised appliances of any kind (2001:183). The 
combined use of both words in the context of the Gardener passage is claimed 
by Kurtz to denote the ingenious aspect of the machine, but he also stresses 
that: ‘ ... it is used to designate the basic components of the swape [well-sweep] 
– xie and its particular features, such as the lever. It is the ji that enable the xie 
to “accomplish much with little effort”’ (2001:188).  
 
Following Kurtz, I argue that the primary meaning of the words used by the 
Gardener are descriptive - the well-sweep has a ji part (the lever) and xie part 
(the bucket), and it is not the Gardener’s intention to single out a particular 
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category of technology in the manner suggested by Allen. On the contrary, I 
claim that he objects to all technological devices. The Gardener arguably implies 
that that using the well-sweep may seem innocent enough in isolation, but 
dependence on technology soon becomes a creeping condition. It is a syndrome 
that starts with one individual and soon becomes endemic throughout a society 
and a culture. The warning tone of the Gardener’s words may be deduced from 
the negative meanings associated with the Chinese words ji xie. 
 
Unsurprisingly, given that China’s warring history produced sophisticated 
military technology, both ji and xie share a military origin, with xie often 
referring in ancient texts to weapons (Kurtz, 2001: 183). The origin of these two 
key terms in warfare emphasises the yang aspect of technology mentioned 
above, suggesting an underlying ruthlessness to technological exploitation, 
whose ultimate aim is frequently the giving up of the resource or life of its target 
for human consumption. This is further reinforced by the idea of the crossbow 
aiming at its target. Allen says that machines ‘reek of intentionality’ (2010:152). 
This is an important point as it is an inherent property of any given piece of 
equipment that it should achieve a clearly defined aim. It cannot afford to miss 
its mark or else it becomes redundant. Such precise purposiveness is the mark of 
all technology, not just selected examples.  
 
Some other meanings of ji offer interesting insights. ‘That which controls the 
beginning’ (Kurtz, 2001) is an appropriate definition of machinery, for example 
where a winding-cog produces results well beyond the scope of the initial 
action. Ji, with its associated idea of the trigger, tantalisingly suggests the notion 
of movement which is so pertinent to machinery and to any technological 
society. Once the trigger has been released what results is motion, and, in the 
case of machinery, perpetual motion. The resulting effect is that those involved 
with the machinery, whether it is the well-sweep or any other labour saving 
device, are not left to enjoy their leisure, which is the promise of technology, but 
are forever making sure that it works properly, trying to improve it and to make 
it even more efficient. The ultimate result is a Heart in perpetual motion. 
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Xie, too, has some interesting associations. Needham alludes to the original 
meaning of the word as ‘fetters’ or ‘shackles’ (1956:125), speculating that 
because these particular implements made use of a padlock, it gave rise to the 
general meaning of machine or mechanism. But he also mentions the associated 
phonetically derived word which means ‘to warn’, leading him to conjecture that 
the Daoist unease with technology arose from the technology of the day being 
largely in the hands of feudal lords whose political power and authority they 
despised. I hope I am not being too fanciful in suggesting that when the 
Gardener voiced his rejection of the well-sweep, it was because embedded in 
the words ji and xie are voices that warn against the enticing promise of 
technology; they warn that once ensnared in the web of a technological culture, 
there is no escape. 
 
Wu wei and dao technology 
Allen’s main argument, however, concerns his proposition that there could be a 
dao of technology. He extrapolates from the Gardener story that there are other 
technologies which, with their supporting knowledge, do not disturb the balance 
of nature insofar as they follow the principle of wu wei or actionless action. 
These, he says, should be viewed favourably. Wu wei is normally translated as 
the paradoxical ‘actionless action’, ‘non-action’ (Møllgaard 2007), or ‘non-
coersive activity’ (Ames 2003). Needham gives the more specific: ‘refraining 
from activity contrary to nature’ (1956:68). Allen follows Needham. As examples 
of dao technology that uses the principle of wu wei he gives the double-action 
bellows, the reduced arc of a bridge and fenestrated rudders which lessen the 
resistance of water. These, he claims, demonstrate a fundamentally different 
approach to the crude force of machine technology as they are based on 
observation of the spontaneous organisation of nature. Such spontaneous 
organisation appears effortless as it makes use of actionless action. A 
characteristic feature of Dao technology, according to Allen is the way in which 
it mimics the effortlessness of nature by taking advantage of naturally present 
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forces. He claims that it is only ingenious machines – the kind of all-to-clever 
technology that doesn’t make use of naturally occurring forces – that are the 
object of the Gardener’s derision. 
 
Taking first Allen’s assertion that there is a dao of technology or engineering 
(Allen uses both terms interchangeably), it would appear that the Gardener’s 
shame is based on the argument that the more sophisticated the machine, the 
more it lacks subtlety when contrasted with power that can be released by 
working with the wu wei or actionless action of the dao. Wu wei power makes 
use of the yin or passive qualities of the dao whereas machines operate on the 
basis of an excessive yang energy that destroys the balance of nature (Schipper 
1993:197; Allen 2010:151). The true power of the dao, according to Allen, arises 
from the superior art of grasping things as they emerge into reality, and before 
they become fixed in material forms that require the brute strength of 
machinery to capture their resource. Dao engineering uses the power of the 
‘fruitful void’ where one can ‘... read the incipience at work in circumstances ... It 
is knowing how to do the most with the least, achieve the greatest effectiveness 
by the least expenditure; at the limit, doing nothing with nothing left undone’ 
(2010:157). It is such a dao of engineering that Allen believes the Gardener 
would commend.  
 
Daoist empiricism 
Allen’s proposition for a ‘dao of technology’ sounds attractive. If there can be a 
Zen art of motorbike maintenance, why not a dao of technology? However, the 
first problem to arise involves Allen’s claim that dao technology could be based 
on a form of empiricism. He follows Needham’s account of proto-science in 
ancient China (1978:98) which suggests there was a scientific base to Daoist 
knowledge that exploited observable phenomena. This accumulated knowledge 
attempted to repeat results of experimentation on a regular basis for the 
purpose of achieving specific end results. Certainly the ancient Chinese 
possessed a developed knowledge of the properties of materials, the way they 
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behaved when subjected to heat, combined with other materials and so forth. 
Much of this knowledge arose from the practice of alchemy, whose goal was the 
achievement of transcendence. So the Daoists were not without detailed 
technical know-how (literally know how, as theirs was a truly practical 
knowledge) as is evidenced by the Lüshi Chunchiu where it says: ‘Copper is soft, 
tin is soft, but if you mix both metals together they become hard. If you heat 
them they will again become liquid. Thus if you wet one thing it becomes dry 
and solid; if you heat a (hard) thing it becomes liquid’ (in Needham, 1956:72). 
From this account we can see that the empirical knowledge developed by the 
ancient Chinese encompassed the laws of causational physics in much the same 
way as we understand these in modern science. These laws of physics which 
turn natural forces into clearly understood rules and procedures are the 
foundation on which technology is based.  
 
For Daoists, the philosophical purpose of acquiring empirical knowledge was not 
so much to use it for human gain or to control nature, as to produce a state of 
calm confidence in a predictable world (Needham, 1956: 63-68). Otherwise, for 
the ancient Chinese, human beings were prone to living a life of terror in a world 
constantly emerging out of chaos and confusion (hundun混沌). This account of 
Daoist empiricism certainly fits the context of the Zhuangzi story which implies 
that, from what the Gardener tells us, this knowledge should not be put into use 
for the purpose of manipulating nature. For as the Gardener states,  
With a heart like a machine in your breast, there will be a lacking in 
pure whiteness. The gods of life [of the body] will be disturbed and 
there will no longer be a place there for the Tao to dwell.  
 
(tr. Schipper, 1993:196) 
 
A clear distinction, however, needs to be made between Allen’s examples of dao 
technology as a form of empiricism and the scientific knowledge described by 
Needham. The latter, it may be claimed, is yang in its fundamental mode, insofar 
as it shares the same purposeful character as that on which machine technology 
is based. Dao technology, on the other hand, may indeed have an empirical base 
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as it arises from the observation of how natural forces converge. However, the 
principle governing this technology is wu wei, which is manifestly yin (yielding 
and passive) in character. The laws of wu wei at work here are quite different 
from those of physics. When wu wei is at work there is a naturally occurring 
spontaneity, such that the latent energy of the source can only be captured at 
random, when it naturally occurs. For example the windmill will only work when 
the wind blows. If human beings benefit from this latent power, it is only 
indirectly. There are numerous examples of this latent power in the Zhuangzi. 
For instance, the swimmer who says, ‘I go in with the currents and come out 
with the flow’ (Palmer, 2006:162); cook Ting whose knowledge of the ox allows 
his knife to slice effortlessly with the grain of muscles and tendons (2006:22); 
the bell-stand carver who chooses only that piece of wood which contains the 
potential shape of bell-stand stand he is going to carve (2006: 163), and so on. In 
every instance the principle of wu wei requires finding the (re)source (the river, 
the ox, the piece of wood) anew and gauging what its particular latent tendency 
is at that given moment in time. Understanding the innate nature of the river, 
the ox, and the wood is the job of the craftsperson, who in turn must be tuned 
in to his or her own innate nature through stillness and meditation. 
 
The point I wish to make about these examples is that action that is wu wei 
leaves the medium unchanged. The river flows as it has always flowed, but its 
currents are a free by-product for the swimmer; the knife used by cook Ting 
never needs to be sharpened; the wood chosen by the bell-stand carver yields 
up the shape locked within it. Allen argues that the distinguishing characteristic 
of dao technology is that it appears to work effortlessly. I argue that Allen’s 
analysis misses the point. The point is that the principle of wu wei, which 
characterises the examples given by Allen, ensures that the original source of 
latent power remains unchanged. Wu wei actions are yin and any attainment of 
human aims is, in a sense, incidental, merely a secondary by-product of the 
power of the river, the grain of the wood and the energy of the air.  
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The art of releasing the latent power in these diverse sources is not something 
that can simply be described or talked about. Wheelwright Pien says of his craft: 
‘When I work on a wheel, if I hit too softly, pleasant as this is, it doesn’t make for 
a good wheel. If I hit furiously, I get tired and the thing doesn’t work! So I grasp 
it in my hand and hold it in my heart. I cannot express this by word of mouth, I 
just know it. I cannot teach this to my son, nor can my son learn it from me’ 
(Palmer, 2006:115). Knowledge of nature’s yin qualities cannot be quantified in 
standard theories that are required by science or engineering as they cannot be 
repeated exactly on every occasion because the precise configuration of nature 
is different every time. Without the reduction to standard modes required by 
machinery, the apprentice must learn the craft through personal experience. 
Moreover, the intrinsic nature of this knowledge is such that it should not be 
quantified. That would assume that the aim was constant repeatability in order 
to guarantee permanent control over nature. 
 
Chapter conclusion 
Can there actually be a dao of technology? Given that technology is of its nature 
yang (that is, every example of machinery has a specific aim which it must 
achieve) in every instance its raison d’être is to harness a form of natural power 
and produce a standard, quantifiable result for some human purpose or other. 
Such a technology would go against the very grain of the dao.  
 
Allen further deepens the contradiction posed by proposing a dao of technology 
by declaring that tools and machines are the same thing. He says: ‘The truth is 
that tools are machines, mechanically speaking’ (2010:152). He cites the 
examples in the Zhuangzi of artisans (the cook, wheelwright, bell-stand carver) 
whose skilful use of tools is viewed favourably. They prepare themselves for 
utter concentration with fasting and meditation, and so are able to perform 
their craft to their utmost ability by entering the ‘fruitful void’ of the dao and 
releasing its latent energy. Allen is right to imply that tools do not fall under 
Daoist strictures; they naturally belong to the craft of artisans. However, the 
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examples of dao engineering he gives, that is, the bellows, the bridge, and the 
fenestrated oars, are not machines. They fall into the same category as the 
artisan examples only insofar as they are artefacts or tools. They may of course 
be the product of technology or engineering, but that does not make them 
machines as such. It is possible that machines can exploit what he calls the ‘self-
organisation of nature’; however, by virtue of the fact that technology is being 
used at all, the self-organised nature becomes transformed into something 
different - a resource for human use. Therefore, to speak of a dao of technology 
involves a fundamental misnoma.  
 
Therefore, when Allen writes of the dao of technology as ‘an engineering that 
exploits properties of self-organisation in materials’ (2010:156) he should avoid 
the language that suggests the harvesting of nature’s bounty. That does not 
belong to the kind of wu wei action that the Dao is capable of engendering, for 
just as excessive use of yang energy in technology is wrong, as it alters the 
balance of nature, so the appropriation of latent yin energy would also be 
unethical. The author of the Zhuangzi makes this point when he states:  
‘If both yin and yang are corrupted, then the four seasons will not 
follow each other, the balance of hot and cold will not be kept, and 
this results in distress to the very bodies of the people!’  
(tr. Palmer 2006: 82)  
Corruption occurs when human beings start to use knowledge of nature’s 
secrets for human ends. 
 
The next chapter seeks to uncover what forces are at play in the human Heart 
that has succumbed to the lure of exploiting nature’s reserves. It suggests that 
the Machine Heart warned against by the Zhuangzi is a reality of our own 
making, as we fall under the spell of scientific knowledge. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
The Machine Heart (ji xin機心) 
 
“What do you mean by the Heavenly and the human?” 
 
Jo of the North Sea said, “Horses and oxen have four feet – this is 
what I mean by the Heavenly. Putting a halter on the horse’s head, 
piercing the ox’s nose – this is what I mean by the human. So I say: do 
not let what is human wipe out what is Heavenly; do not let what is 
purposeful wipe out what is fated; do not let [desire for] gain lead 
you after fame. Be cautious, guard it, and do not lose it – this is what 
I mean by returning to the True.” 
 
Zhuangzi (tr. Watson, 1968: 182)  
 
‘The botanists’ plants are not the flowers of the hedgerow; the 
‘source’ which the geographer establishes for a river is not the 
‘springhead in the dale.’’  
(Heidegger, 1978: 100) 
 
The attitude of the Machine Heart 
Having a Machine Heart is first and foremost an attitude towards the natural 
world. It starts with a curiosity to know how things work and soon becomes an 
unquenchable thirst to control nature and an addiction to technology. It is an 
attitude that can very quickly harden into a habit and become the defining mark 
of an entire society’s culture. The Machine Heart is rooted in an anthropocentric 
view that pitches efficient expenditure of effort and utilitarian values as the 
highest aspirations of humankind. In order to achieve these goals, the Machine 
Heart becomes closed in a loop of seeking knowledge of the essence of things 
which in turn feeds the world view it espouses. Ultimately, such a Heart can only 
see nature through the lens of scientific laws as a resource for human 
consumption. When this happens nature becomes disenchanted, or to use the 
words of Jo of the North, we ‘let what is human wipe out what is Heavenly’. 
Nature loses a quality which constitutes far more than the loss of an aesthetic or 
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religious gloss imposed on it by human sensibility. Human purposefulness and 
intention become the overriding factors that blind us to the sacred in nature.  
 
If it is a loss for nature, it is a far more fundamental calamity for human beings. 
The Gardener tells us it disturbs the equilibrium of the body, and results in the 
body being a place where the gods no longer wish to dwell. For how can the 
gods inhabit a sterile land which no longer pulses with the unhampered flow of 
its own qi energy? Instead the body, or the life of the whole person, becomes a 
restless mechanism that chimes in time with the man-made cogs of technology 
that determine its habits and rhythms. This body has become no more than yet 
another natural resource and subject to the same laws. The mystery of the 
human Heart and of the human being are lost.  
 
In turning to Heidegger’s essay, The Question Concerning Technology, I seek to 
understand a little better what it means to have a Machine Heart (Heidegger, 
1977). Although Heidegger did not comment on the Zhuangzi itself, it appears 
that there is some useful common ground between the sketchy outline of the 
dangers of technology, tantalisingly suggested by the Gardener story and other 
fleeting passages in this ancient Daoist text, and the fully fledged theory spelt 
out by Heidegger. This chapter will give a necessarily brief outline of the key 
elements of Heidegger’s thoughts on the matter, and will then discuss some 
points of synergy with the Zhuangzi. These include the implications for nature of 
manipulating it into a resource for human consumption and the ensuing loss to 
our own humanity. 
 
The question concerning technology 
Heidegger’s epistemological methodology involves breaking down a problem 
step by step in order to reveal the true, as opposed to the apparent, issue 
underlying the question. The Question Concerning Technology seeks to uncover 
what in truth is the essence of technology, or to phrase it differently, what is the 
thing that gives life to the many manifest examples of technology in modern 
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culture? Counter-intuitively, Heidegger tells us, technology is not something 
technological. For instance, the sum of our cumulative scientific knowledge that 
allows us to craft ever more sophisticated machines and gadgets does not 
constitute technology, although both craft - the origin of technology - and 
scientific knowledge are essential components of technology. Neither is it the 
philosophical principle of instrumentalism, that is, devising means to achieve 
specific ends. What characterises the innermost property of technology is, 
according to Heidegger, the pressure it places on nature to become simply a 
storehouse for human consumption. As Heidegger puts it: ‘...[that] which puts to 
nature the unreasonable demand that it supply energy that can be extracted 
and stored as such’ (1977:14). This is the one principle that dictates the 
existence of technology. Technology is the expression of our will to rearrange 
the power and energy stored in various forms in different natural resources and 
make it readily accessible for our own needs. 
 
Heidegger refers to this as turning nature into a Bestand which is commonly 
translated into English as a ‘standing reserve’. The stilted English translation of 
the term fails to do justice to the full impact of Heidegger’s thought here. A 
more romanticised version might render it as ‘nature’s storehouse’ but that 
would lose the element of chilling calculation that the word Bestand conjures 
up. To think of nature as a stock-pile perhaps gets across something of the 
economic imperative that has been imposed on nature by our technological 
culture. Technology, according to Heidegger, commands nature to give up its 
latent energy resources in the following way: ‘That challenging happens in that 
the energy concealed in nature is unlocked, what is unlocked is transformed, 
what is transformed is stored up, what is stored up is, in turn, distributed, and 
what is distributed is switched about ever anew’ (1997:16). Any uniqueness in 
nature is lost in this reductive process, as further, the idea of the stockpile turns 
nature into a standard product, an object that can be expedited, (to use 
Heidegger’s phrase) to wherever it is determined by human beings it should go.  
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According to Jo of the North in the Zhuangzi the choice is ours whether we see 
nature as Heavenly or as a stockpile. ‘Oxen and horses have four feet’ which 
allow them to wander wherever they choose. By piercing their noses and fitting 
them with halters, human beings deprive them of natural lives and harness the 
power latent within their bodies. This goes against the Daoist principle of non-
interference with nature. Once we start to domesticate animals in this way our 
ability to see them as possessors of intrinsic rights to a ‘natural’ life is lost for 
good. This is the same process of inurement as the Gardener arguably expresses 
when he objects to the seemingly innocuous use of such simple technology as 
the well-sweep, as this one act may lead us before long to complete dependence 
on machines. The habitual results in blindness our loss and nature’s. 
 
There is a degree of similarity between Heidegger’s assertion that nature has 
become for us a Bestand, and the idea of a disenchanted nature or 
Entzauberung as discussed by Szerszynski (2005). The latter is premised on the 
reduction of nature to scientific principles which explain away all the mysteries 
of nature. It claims that the ultimate reality is that revealed by science. It is on 
the basis of this scientific knowledge that we have been able to create 
technologies that can strip nature of its inherent powers and turn it into the 
stockpile that Heidegger posits. But Heidegger makes the important point that it 
is not scientific knowledge as such that alters nature. Neither is it the degree to 
which modern technology has pervaded every quarter of nature. For it is a 
modern myth that Entzauberung belongs to the post Industrial Revolution era. 
The significance of the story of the Gardener in the Zhuangzi is that it warns 
against the human perspective that is capable of ignoring the Heavenly in nature 
and results in damage to humanity. 
 
Heidegger’s view is similar insofar as he states that what characterises 
technology is the attitude behind our impulse to make nature a Bestand. He 
gives some interesting examples to make his point - examples that resonate 
closely with some of those in the Zhuangzi. He cites the windmill, which is 
moved by air currents but does not store them; the field cultivated by the 
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peasant is not the same as agribusiness; the River Rhine is not the energy 
resource that is created by the dam powering the hydroelectric plant. These are 
instances that demonstrate how the human eye can flicker between seeing 
nature as sacred or through the lens of scientific realism and technological 
efficiency. For the Gardener in the Zhuangzi it would be an anathema to follow 
Zigon’s advice that with little effort he could achieve a great result. If he were to 
use the well-sweep to irrigate his patch of land it would, to use Heidegger’s 
words, ‘challenge the soil of the field’ (1997:15) preventing the natural course of 
events whereby the field would ensure the fertility of the crop without undue 
forcing.  
 
Before nature becomes a Bestand, there is the possibility that its true being (it’s 
Heavenly nature) may yet become apparent to us, for nature has a revelatory 
aspect to it for Heidegger. What is hidden in nature is not the scientific laws that 
determine its functioning or the composition of minerals that form its energy 
resource. These are the objects of human curiosity and striving for knowledge. 
What nature can reveal is the true essence of creativity that is encapsulated in 
what Heidegger refers to as Being when it manifests itself in the world of 
phenomena. For Heidegger the natural creativity of Being expressed in nature as 
poetry (poesis) is prevented when ‘Modern science’s way of representing 
pursues and entraps nature as a calculable coherence of forces’ (1997:21). In the 
Zhuangzi, where the Machine Heart holds sway fruitfulness is denied its natural 
form of expression whether in the actual fruiting of the tree or the luxurious 
coats of animals. 
 
Whereas for Heidegger the stock-piling of nature as reserve-stores inhibits the 
revelation of Being in nature’s ‘natural’ form, in the Zhuangzi it is formulated in 
a slightly different way, as utilitarianism strips things of their entitlement to life. 
This is what Jo of the North, in the quotation above, refers to when he says: ‘Do 
not let what is purposeful wipe out what is fated’ (Watson Tr. 1968: 182). The 
potential energy resource contained in the natural life-cycles of creatures and 
living entities should not be expedited by the human demand that they yield up 
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their power prematurely. This robs them of their entitlement to a natural life 
span. This is a recurrent theme in the Zhuangzi. In one of several stories 
concerning trees, Master Shih dreams about a tree which tells him about 
ornamental trees: ‘Because they are useful, they suffer, and they are unable to 
live out the years Heaven has given to them. They have only their usefulness to 
blame for this destruction wrought by the people ... Furthermore, you and I are 
both [such] things’ (Palmer, 2006:34). This suggests that the instrumentalisation 
of nature can easily be extended to people – we become ‘human resources,’ 
something that Heidegger’s essay goes on to affirm.  
 
Further, this passage implies that nature bequeaths the tree a right to a future 
life which should not be curtailed for human ends. This does not imply a 
doctrine of sentientism that requires the tree to have conscious knowledge of its 
future in order to possess any intrinsic rights, but there is the idea that there is 
something wrong with systematically curtailing the natural lifespan of all 
animate and inanimate things. In this story the surreal medium of the dream 
allows the tree a conscious identity and the power of speech, suggesting that it 
is only when we imaginatively personify natural objects that we can recognise 
their right to defend their lives. In ‘real’ life the tree cannot protest its right to 
life, for its usefulness to humans is a guarantor of its own destruction. The same 
sentiment is expressed about the fox and snow leopard who live in the 
mountain forest and only go out when they have to for fear of being caught. 
Their coats are to blame for their lives being cut short (Palmer, 2006:168).  
 
Knowing the essential nature of things 
The Zhuangzi suggests it is the endless seeking after knowledge in order to 
manipulate nature that is misguided. The example of the Yellow Emperor is a 
case in point of what Daoists considered to be the ill-conceived quest for 
knowledge. The Emperor says: ‘I would like to grasp the essence of Heaven and 
Earth and use them to assist the harvest of the five crops in order to help the 
people. I would like to be able to direct yin and yang in order to bring all things 
to life’ (Palmer, 2006:85). Even if the motivation is philanthropic, the 
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consequences of seeking domination over nature’s resources are predicable. 
The Emperor is told that since he started to rule, nature’s power to order things 
harmoniously have diminished: ‘...the very breath of the clouds has not yet 
formed, and yet it rains; the trees and the bushes drop their leaves before they 
have turned yellow; the light of the sun and moon grows ever weaker.’ The 
message of the Zhuangzi is clear: meddle with nature at your peril. This passage 
is particularly interesting as it dispels any idea that modern day environmental 
ethics may possess about Western culture being the source of pernicious 
scientific thinking while romanticising traditional Chinese concepts of yin and 
yang. The Daoist view expressed in the Zhuangzi indicates that even these pre-
scientific concepts were subject scepticism about manipulating forces of nature 
for the benefit of humankind. 
 
How the Zhuangzi accounts for natural patterns and energies being disrupted as 
a result of human interference is somewhat different from the present day 
narrative. Today’s science offers a number of causes for natural disasters. These 
range from CO₂ induced global warming, upsetting the fine balance of the 
biosphere through pollution, and the devastation of habitats and species 
extinction. Although the degree to which human action is responsible is 
disputed, our physical interventions are generally agreed to be at least partly 
responsible. The model behind the modern explanation is that of pure causality; 
however, the explanation offered by the Zhuangzi, however, is more 
metaphysical. There are a number of references in the Zhuangzi to the idea that 
something fundamental in nature is being altered when human beings start to 
manipulate nature: 
‘The disruption of the ways of Heaven distresses the true being of 
things [qing情], halting the development of Heaven’s Mysteries ... 
This causes animals to disperse, the birds to sing throughout the 
night, misfortune to hit the crops and woods, and disaster to blight 
the very insects themselves. Alas, all this is caused by the people’s 
error of thinking they know how to rule!’   
 
(tr.Palmer, 2006:88) 
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Elsewhere, this is put as ‘innate nature’: ‘There is no humble insect, not even 
any plant, that has not lost its innate nature (xing性). This is the consequence 
for the world of seeking after knowledge’ (Palmer 2006:80). And later in the 
same chapter, ‘We let the world be, fearful of spoiling its innate nature; we 
leave it alone, fearful of those who adversely affect the world’s Virtue. If the 
nature of everything under Heaven is not distorted, if the world’s Virtue is not 
despoiled, then what need is there to govern the world?’ (2006: 82).  
 
The phrases ‘the true being of things’ (qing情) and ‘innate nature’ (xing性) are 
closely related, sharing the first component of their Chinese character. They also 
share related meaning insofar as qing suggests ‘essence’, or that which we 
experience in our specific encounter with different entities. Graham explains 
that qing as the essence of a thing is closely linked with nominalist approach to 
language, as a particular thing is identified on the basis of its qing (1989:99). 
Innate nature, xing, is described by Møllgaard as ‘ ... the spontaneous movement 
and natural development of a being in the movement of life’ (2007:39). 
Møllgaard’s definition suggests that xing should not be seen as a static set of 
characteristics, but encompasses the ability of the thing in question to change 
throughout its existence. For example, science might understand the essence of 
a sunflower see in terms of its specific characteristics captured in the snapshot 
of that particular stage of its existence. The Daoist, however, would see the 
essence of the sunflower in the entirety of its unfolding existence. This is 
something that is key to the passages above. According to Graham (1989:123) 
xing was used in the everyday language of Mengzi’s time to denote the qualities 
that any living thing was born with (its ‘in-nate’ essence). The developmental 
characteristics of xing are suggested from its derived etymology from the word 
sheng (生) – to be born or to live (Unger, 2000: 95-98).  
 
Palmer follows the usual convention of translating de as ‘virtue’ which today 
carries strong moral overtones. Karyn Lai offers an interesting discussion which 
points to the pitfalls associated with the word virtue (2003:249-251). She 
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suggests that there is little to support de as suggesting moral goodness. Palmer’s 
translation, therefore, gives the rather misleading idea that interference with 
the essential nature of natural phenomena is morally untenable. If, instead, we 
follow Lai’s argument that de denotes the particular integrity or power inherent 
in specific manifestations of the dao, this gives us a different reading. What we 
then understand is that what the Zhuangzi is referring to is the object-specific, 
inner, or hidden power that every living thing is endowed with. This suggests 
that it is not so much a moral concern, but that human involvement with the 
world is about the utilization of the power of all things. 
 
So when the Zhuangzi talks of qing and xing as being fundamentally altered by 
the human search for knowledge, he is making the claim that the human 
attitude encapsulated in the Machine Heart delimits the very essence of things. 
It alters the ontological basis of existence, over their entire lifespan, for those 
entities whose inner power we are seeking to capture within our system of 
knowledge. Put simply, things are not allowed to be themselves once they are 
the subject of scientific objectification. In Heidegger’s words, ‘Modern science’s 
way of representing pursues and entraps nature as a calculable coherence of 
forces’ (1997:21). In order to see animals, nature, and all natural phenomena 
scientifically, an important part of their true identity is left behind. At its most 
basic, they give up their naturally endowed lives, in order to make their essence, 
or power available for human use. They cannot be seen in their completeness, 
and, as a result, human beings lose something of their humanity if they 
persevere in seeing the world purely as a utilitarian resource.  
 
Chapter conclusion 
When we see the world without compassion we are being governed by the 
Machine Heart. The Zhuangzi says: ‘The disruption of the ways of Heaven 
distresses the true being of things [qing 情], halting the development of 
Heaven’s Mysteries ...’ The word distress is strong. It implies a fundamental 
unbalancing of the way that things should naturally be. All creatures are part of 
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a food chain, so naturally prey for other creatures, but human actions are about 
more than just nourishment for the sake of subsistence. Human activity 
constantly tries to suck the energy out of this natural pattern of how things are, 
and this results in imbalance and distortion. This is a view which finds resonance 
in Heidegger’s thinking when he writes about the scientific view of nature 
denying us the possibility of accessing the revelatory aspect of nature. The story 
of the Gardener in the Zhuangzi tells us that this process starts with the human 
Heart. What aspect of the Heart’s many capabilities is that allows the process to 
take a hold in the first instance? 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
The Origin of the Machine Heart (ji xie 機心):  
Naming and Classifying 
 
When we start to regulate the world, we introduce names. 
But once names have been assigned, 
We must know when to stop. 
Knowing when to stop is how to avoid danger. 
Chapter 32 Daodejing (tr. Ames , 2003:127) 
 
He [Cangjie] observed the footprints of birds and beasts, and 
recognized that meaningful patterns could be distinguished. For the 
first time he created graphs and tallies. All types of craftsmen were 
thereby put in order, and all types of products were thereby 
examined. 
 
(tr. Lewis, 1999:272) 
 
Regulation of the world: the Confucian view 
One specific ability that can be attributed to the Heart concerns logical thinking 
and the classification of phenomena. The Zhuangzi tells us that, ‘If there is a 
name, there is reality and they really exist. If there is no name, there is no reality 
and no thing’ (Palmer, 2006:234). The ‘regulation of the world’ by naming 
referred to in the quotation above from the Daodejing is the pre-technological 
interpretation of human environmental existence in order to make sense of, and 
to control, future situations. Naming the world is, at its most basic, a struggle for 
mastery over the environment. It becomes a feature of the Machine Heart when 
the only engagement with nature is through the medium of logical categories 
and scientific classification. The Genesis story is often cited as the root of the 
Western, anthropocentric domination over nature. Adam is awarded the right to 
name the creatures of God’s creation and to govern over them. In the Daoiost 
account, the dao gives birth to the myriad things: the uncountable fecundity of 
natural forms. Human beings naturally impose order on the environment by 
53 
 
naming, classifying and seeking logical connections between phenomena that 
might otherwise seems chaotic and unpredictable (See Needham 1956:63-67). 
The philosopher Xunxi tells us that, ‘Through using the logical categories, one 
deals with diversity; through using the principle of unity, one deals with the 
myriad ... Abandon these principles, and the empire will fall into decay’ (Xunzi, 
1990:103).  
 
As Graham describes, the later Mohist canon shows the same, nominalist 
approach to language. Being able to identify the category to which a thing 
belongs to is to own the source of knowledge about it (1989:141). Graham also 
suggests that this was certainly the backdrop to the critique of language 
contained in the Zhuangzi:  
In response to the instability of reference (“what is said is not fixed”) 
the Mohists aspire to the ideal of an austere, functional, transparent 
language; the Confucians emphasize the need for the rectification of 
names, for the proper correspondence of things and names 
supposedly sustain moral-political order; the logicians expound 
paradoxes that claim internal, self-referential, analytical coherence. 
(Graham, 1989:95) 
 
Ames’ commentary on Chapter 32 of the Daodejing, however, brings out the 
ironic reversal that occurs: ‘We quickly fall into the trap of turning names into 
things, so that these names identify some more real “I know-not-what” that 
stands independent of the now “superficial” way in which we actually 
experience any particular event’ (2003:127). The Nietzschean tone of Ames’ 
interpretation is unmistakeable. Concepts that serve a useful purpose in 
enabling human beings to negotiate a path through the world become 
embedded over time in rigid structures that carry moral and cultural meaning 
over and above the original, practical assignation of the word. Ames’ 
genealogical exploration hints that the ‘mechanisation’ of the Heart starts with a 
form of a Nietzschean ‘will to power’. The Daodejing suggests that there is a 
definite power drive in the naming process, and like all human wants and 
desires, it requires our awareness in order to contain it, before it becomes so 
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deeply ingrained as a morally encoded human activity, that we never question 
our right to wield such power.  
 
For Confucian thinkers, the ability to classify, organise and set the standard by 
which everything can be understood and measured was essentially a moral 
function of the human heart, moreover a function that only the highest human 
being could perform. The Zhongyong tells us that:  
‘Thus, one who is not in the position of the Son of Heaven does not 
discourse upon the rites, not does he issue regulations regarding 
standard measures or conduct enquiries into the form of the written 
script. In all the world today, all carriages run on wheels of uniform 
gauge, all official documents use uniform script, and all customary 
practices follow uniform ethical standards.’ 
(tr. Plaks, 2003: 49) 
 
Discoursing, creating laws and rules and making moral judgement are all 
examples of skills that require a high degree of discernment of differences, 
measuring and creating standard ways of proceeding that can buffer us from the 
chaotic diversities of life. But according to Confucius, the ability to see order in 
the world arises in the first place from a strong moral disposition. This 
disposition towards order and the creation of regulatory standards is also the 
prerequisite for the creation of technological devices and it is interesting to note 
how the imagery of technology takes on added significance as it is used to 
convey a normative view of the ethics of rulership and justice in other Confucian 
texts. Not everyone’s word carried such power, the supreme repository of 
political power being the emperor. Chapter 9 of the Huinanzi attempts to 
explain the conditions under which the ruler’s words carry unquestioning 
authority: 
Because the crosspiece of a pair of scales shows no bias towards 
either the right or the left in weighing, it can be level (p’ing). Because 
a plumb line shows no bias toward inside or out in measuring, it can 
be straight (cheng). Because the ruler in administering the law shows 
no bias toward those he likes or dislikes, his words can be command 
(ming).  
(tr. Ames, 1994:174) 
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The passage goes on to elaborate on the imagery of the pair of scales and the 
plumb line, examples of early measuring technology, by bringing out their 
essential characteristics. These are constancy, accuracy, fitness for purpose, and 
lasting use. These characteristics are not unique to the instruments in question. 
In fact, they constitute the general design specification for any piece of 
technology, and could be applied to any modern piece of equipment. Indeed, 
they still form the blueprint for many of the qualities we seek in technological 
solutions today.  
 
The use of the metaphor of the set of scales to talk about the Heart is not 
uncommon in the early Chinese texts. Xunzi describes the moral ‘weighing up’ 
processes of the Heart in terms of the balancing of scales (Graham tr. 1989:252). 
In this way, the early Chinese authors of these texts demonstrate a high degree 
of awareness of the theoretical principles of design and function in technology. 
They also show the extent to which such qualities were highly valued, such that 
their metaphorical meaning was instantly understood. The values of technology 
at this point start to infiltrate the texture of the Heart itself, and indicate that 
the criteria that determined the very best technology were also considered as 
the qualities that gave unquestioning power to the judgement to the Heart (and 
therefore the word of the ruler). In this way, we see ideas associated with 
technology taking on moral status as guides to thinking and behaviour. 
 
Proper social ordering was a key part of Confucian moral doctrine during the 
period when the Zhuangzi was written. For Xunzi, social and economic order 
mesh closely with nature. For example, each geographical area should yield up 
its naturally present resources, and people of every skill, status and trade in 
society should play their part in the smoothly running mechanism of society 
(Xunzi, 1990:102). However, Møllgaard (2007:33) points out that that for Xunxi, 
there is little that is natural in the human imposition of order. Man-made rules, 
whether in relation to ritual or social order, are essentially artificial as their aim 
is to control nature. This extends to human desires as well as nature’s chaotic 
forces.  
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Xunzi criticises economic competition as being potentially divisive to society. The 
economic system he advocates is based on sufficient supply, as nature itself is 
seen as the source of ever abundant bounty, providing social codes and 
hierarchies are adhered to. He praises the harmony that is achieved by all 
classes of people working together. The whole moral structure of society should 
be held together by the authority of the ruler who imposes just laws. Support for 
this kind of ordered world view is also present in the Huainanzi, which states 
that in the idealised time of ancient history, 
‘A worker did not have more than one skill, a scholar did not combine 
two offices (kuan). Each kept to his own province and did not 
interfere with others (kan); each person found his niche and each 
thing found its place (an). As a result, products were not of inferior 
quality and duties were not neglected (man).’ 
 
(tr. Ames, 1994:176)  
 
The Machine Heart of Confucianism becomes the collective Heart of society, as 
optimum social functioning is conceived as a precise mechanism that relies on 
each individual’s recognition of their place and role. The entire structure is 
upheld by moral principles that deplore the potential anarchy that may be 
caused by individualism. 
 
The environmental theory contained in this Confucian account is that the world 
of Heaven, Earth and Man is tightly knit, held together by natural laws that 
reinforce a strict hierarchy where everyone and everything has its place. So long 
as the classifications are adhered to, harmony and prosperity will follow. Xunzi 
expresses great faith in nature supplying all that is needed: ‘Those that supply 
food and nourishment cannot be counted. Heaven and Earth in producing the 
myriad things assuredly intended that there be surpluses adequate to feed 
humanity’ (1990:128). This is not to say that their people should wantonly 
consume, as careful planning and management of resources was key to the 
sound rulership of the state. Xunzi’s sentiments are echoed by the author of The 
Art of Rulership, who says:  
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The ruler of men should take advantage of the season of heaven 
above (shih), make full use of the earth’s plenty below (t’sai), and 
deploy the energies of the people wisely in between (li). As a result, 
all living things will reach maturity and the five grains will thrive 
(chih). 
 
(tr. Ames, 1994:200) 
 
Knowing when to stop: the Daoist view 
In contrast with Xunzi’s Confucian support of order and logical ordering of the 
world, the Zhuangzi, rather like the Daodejing, slates the relentless desire for 
understanding the world through ever finer classifications and distinctions that 
make up the body of knowledge valued by society. The Zhuangzi urges us not to 
pursue the path of imposing language as our primary means of interacting with 
and understanding nature. It states, ‘Heaven and Earth have great beauty but no 
words. The four seasons follow their regular path but do not debate it. All forms 
of life have their distinct natures but do not discuss them’ (2006:189). It is 
precisely the regulation of the world through language that the Confucians 
found so commendable to which the Zhuangzi objects and holds responsible for 
its deterioration. The process of decline which the Zhuangzi identifies in society 
starts with the particularisation of phenomena into nominal forms which then 
develop into laws, edicts and morals imposed by rulers, and the seeking after 
knowledge by different intellectual schools. In sharp contrast to the author of 
the Huainanzi who praised contemporary technology, Zhuangzi despairs that:  
‘The whole world sought knowledge and all the different peoples of 
the world were distracted. At this stage the axe and saw came into 
their own; the plumb line determined and brought execution; the 
hammer and gouge made their deep marks and the whole world fell 
into disarray. The crime lies with playing around with people’s 
hearts.’  
 
(tr. Palmer, 1996: 85)  
Here, the axe and the plumb line are seen not as the highest moral values that 
people could aspire to, but the worst manifestation of the Machine Heart which 
coldly calculates and imposes mechanical criteria on to human life. 
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Chapter conclusion 
The Confucian regulation of the world through naming, classifying and imposing 
logical order is based on a superior human relationship to nature. Confucians 
claim this relationship is morally endorsed by Heaven, however Daoists would 
see it as an anthropocentric view that creates distinctions and moral hierarchies 
in order only to benefit humankind. It is here that the seeds of the Machine 
Heart can be found. On the Daoist view, the dao does not favour human beings 
above other species. The ability to name the essence of a thing and to 
understand the hidden qualities of matter, calculating and releasing its potential 
energy, are propensities of the Machine Heart. The Daoist view is deeply 
suspicious of imposing human values on to nature or of any attempt to 
manipulate nature. It is not knowledge as such that is wrong; it is human frailty 
that does not know when to stop. Chapter 80 of the Daodejing envisages a 
perfect society that possesses all kinds of tools and technology but makes the 
conscious choice not to make use of them:  
Small country, few people – 
Hundreds of devices,  
But none are used. 
 
People ponder on death 
And don’t travel far. 
They have carriages and boats, 
But no one goes on board; 
Weapons and armor, 
But no one brandishes them. 
They use knotted cords for counting. 
(tr. Addis., 1993: 80) 
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CONCLUSION 
 
In Defence of the Useless 
 
The first chapter of the Zhuangzi tells of an enormous fish that covers 
unimaginable distances. It rises out of the sea and changes into an equally huge 
bird that covers further, astonishingly large distances. Who knows how it does 
this or what its purpose is, for it certainly does not follow any known pattern or 
natural law. Throughout the Zhuangzi there are many little parables that touch 
on this theme of perspective. Jo of the North says, ‘From the point of view of the 
tiniest, we look at what is so enormous and we cannot comprehend it. From the 
point of view of the most enormous, we look at what is tiniest and we cannot 
see it clearly’ (Palmer tr. 2006:139). The underlying message of the Zhuangzi, if it 
can be framed in this way, is that human values are relative. Therefore, we 
should be cautious in accepting the claim that there is only one ultimate reality. 
The world of machine technology is built upon scientific realism. This closes off 
all other perspectives and locks us into only one conclusion: that we are bound 
by the knowledge base we have created to see the world in terms of scientific 
laws and possible resources for human consumption. There is no freedom for 
either humanity or nature in this world view. The ethical relationship is such that 
nature is always the disadvantaged party. 
 
Curiosity and inventiveness are inherent human qualities. The scientific view of 
the world has become an important part of our culture, but if we allow only one 
model of the world to be the ‘true’ one – that is the narrative endorsed by 
scientific realism – we lose our ability to feel for nature. We then start to acquire 
the habits that are dictated by a Machine Heart. The choices for us and for 
nature become bleak indeed as all our actions and ethical judgements are 
defined by what is judged to be the ultimate good: the efficient extraction of 
resources from nature. 
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The Zhuangzi, however, tells us that our innate nature (xing 性) allows for a 
different mode of existence. This is a mode where we have the power to be. In 
order to experience co-being with nature, we must shut off the outside stimulus 
that constantly feeds the Heart. Without thoughts, the human Heart becomes a 
truly knowing Heart, wordlessly understanding the mysteries of nature. 
According to Daoist belief this is the innate pure state that we are born with, 
evidenced by the unthinking pure life-force of the baby. When we attain the 
state of the ‘uncarved block’ we are able to access a state of pure potentiality. It 
is the same power that is found in the river, the tree, and the lives of animals. 
 
The scientific world view tells us how to predict nature. The technological world 
view, which is so closely linked to science, tells us everything must have a 
purpose, preferably a purpose that will benefit humankind. The Zhuangzi dares 
us to think otherwise. We do not have to view nature’s creatures in terms of 
their usefulness. The tree in the Zhuangzi is a case in point. 
 
Hui Tzu said to Chuang: 
I have a big tree, 
The kind they all a “stink tree.” 
The trunk is so distorted, 
So full of knots, 
No one can get a straight plank  
Out of it. The branches are so crooked 
You cannot cut them up 
In any way that makes sense. 
There it stands beside the road. 
No carpenter will even look at it. 
Zhuangzi (tr. Merton, 1965) 
This is one of those rare cases where human beings have seen no use. Therefore 
the tree has been allowed to reach a great size. This would have been truly 
unusual in ancient China where deforestation and the demand for timber 
wreaked havoc on the environment. This tree has acquired an almost sacred 
status simply by virtue of the fact that it had no useful human purpose 
whatsoever.   
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The Gardener, too, claims his right to useless activity. His watering is almost 
pointless as he is barely able to make an impact on his garden. His toil and effort 
are disproportionate to the result he manages to achieve. But he defends his 
right to such useless activity. Learning to appreciate the useless is something we 
must learn to do. If we are to allow nature to reclaim the magic of which it has 
been robbed by technology we must stop seeking the useful in every 
opportunistic encounter. 
 
Hui Tzu said to Chuang Tzu: 
“All your teaching is centred on what has no use.” 
 
Chuang Tzu replied: 
“If you have no appreciation for what has no use 
You cannot begin to talk about what can be used. 
The earth, for example, is broad and vast 
But of all this expanse a man uses only the few inches 
Upon which he happens to be standing. 
Now suppose that you suddenly take away  
All that he is not actually using 
So that, all around his feet a gulf 
Yawns, and he stands in a Void, 
With nowhere solid except right under each foot: 
How long will he be able to use what he is using?” 
 
Hui Tzu said: “It would cease to serve any purpose.” 
 
Chuang Tzu concluded: 
“This shows the absolute necessity 
Of what has ‘no use’.” 
 
Zhuangzi (tr. Merton: 1965) 
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